Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
A nalyses of the effects of equity investments on Social Security finances often focus on the higher expected mean outcome without sufficient attention to the range of probable outcomes. Since equity investments have historically been riskier than government bonds, 1 we expect them to continue to carry higher risk. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing equity investments on system financeson both mean outcomes and the variance-while recognizing the uncertainty surrounding demographic and economic input assumptions in making any projection about the system, even under current investment practices.
Attention to Social Security investment practices is motivated by both projections of a problem (long-term deficits) and a possible solution (higher returns on large short-term surpluses). In 2000, the Social Security system experienced an annual net inflow of over $150 billion, raising its balance to over one trillion dollars. Once the baby boom generation begins to retire, however, the annual surpluses will almost certainly turn into deficits. According to the intermediate
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projections of the Board of Trustees (2001) , in 2016, costs will exceed income; in 2027, costs will exceed income including interest earnings; and in 2038, the trust funds will be exhausted.
2 Although these specific dates are uncertain, under current law the system will almost certainly become insolvent (CBO, forthcoming) .
By law, balances in the Old-Age, Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund must be invested in special issue Treasury bonds. As the trust fund balances continue to grow over the next 15 years, interest earnings will become a larger part of the system's income. The Social Security Administration (SSA) projects that net interest income will increase from 11 percent of total OASDI income in 2000 to 19 percent in 2010 (Board of Trustees, 2001) . Therefore, changes in the rate of return on those balances will have an increasingly significant effect on system finances. Over the period from 1926-99, intermediate-term government bonds 3 have had an arithmetic average real return of 2.3 percent (Ibbotson Associates, 2000) . In comparison, over this same period common stocks had a real average annual total return of 10.0 percent. Thus investments in common stocks have had over a 7 percentage point higher return on average than government bonds.
Proponents of investing part of the trust funds in equities-either directly or through individual accounts-point out that such a policy would increase expected returns and thus reduce the expected actuarial deficit. 4 Aaron and Reischauer (1998) proposed investing any trust fund surpluses above 150 percent of one-year outlays in common stocks and corporate bonds, and estimated a resulting 55 percent reduction in the 75-year actuarial deficit. 5 The Maintain-Benefits Plan proposed by the 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security claimed to reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by 42 percent through investing 40 percent of trust fund balances in equities (1994 -96 Advisory Council, 1997 .
Unlike those proposals, other work has quantified the added uncertainty from equity investments. MaCurdy and Shoven (2000) modeled a range of outcomes for debt-for-equity swaps by the government outside a model of the Social Security system. They calculated the likelihood that equity investments would outperform government bonds over a series of repeated 10-or-20 year periods. They found a 25 percent chance that over 20 years equity investments will fail to match the returns of government bonds, and thus leave Social Security finances worse off.
Their results illustrate one well known and often stated point and another much overlooked fact about the relationship between swapping government bonds for stocks: On average, stocks offer a much higher yield compared to government bonds, but "borrowing money for ten years to buy stocks is very risky" (MaCurdy and Shoven, 2000, p.19) . Copeland, et. al. (1999) , using the EBRI-SSASIM2 Policy Simulation Model, estimated the effects of President Clinton's 1999 proposal to transfer nearly $3 trillion in general fund revenue into the OASI and DI Trust Funds and to invest 14.6 percent of the trust funds in equities. When they considered only the uncertainty in equities and assumed a 7 percent expected equity return, they estimated a reduction in the 75-year actuarial deficit from -2.19 percent to -0.62 percent of taxable payroll with a range over the 5 th and 95 th percentiles of -1.08 to -0.13. 8 When they ran a fully stochastic model of Social Security, the expected mean actuarial deficit dropped to -1.58 with a range of -3.05 to -0.13. They noted that the estimated 25 th percentile outcome was equivalent to OCACT's 1998 predicted actuarial deficit under current law, suggesting that the risky returns from equity investments open the system to much uncertainty.
However, Copeland, et. al. (1999) failed to provide baseline results measuring the uncertainty under current law. As Campbell and Feldstein (2000) note, any evaluation of the effects of introducing market uncertainty into the Social Security system must recognize that a shift to private investment is not occurring within a riskless system. This paper presents such an analysis using the Long-Term Actuarial Model (LTAM) developed by the Long-Term Modeling Group at the Congressional Budget Office.
We carry out stochastic analyses of the effects of trust fund equity investments on Social Security finances, recognizing that the long-run system outcomes are already subject to much uncertainty. LTAM was programmed to model the uncertainty surrounding the following inputs: mortality improvements, fertility, immigration, inflation, wage growth, interest rates, unemployment, disability incidence, and disability termination. We believe it is important to provide the baseline uncertainty of projected outcomes under current law. Therefore, we compare the uncertain future of Social Security finances with and without equity investment to capture a more complete picture of the trade-off from such investments. 9 We focus on trust fund balances, or ratios of balances to outlays, as our outcome measure, following the conventional framework of relying on this metric to project the outlook for Social Security finances.
Any analysis of the effects of equity investment on Social Security finances will be quite sensitive to a choice of future expected equity returns. For our analysis, we adopt the 3 percent risk premium suggested by the Social Security Advisory Board's 1999 Technical Panel, which results in an expected 6 percent real return. 10 We also test the sensitivity of the results to assuming a higher 7 percent real return, as assumed by the 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security.
The analysis will also be sensitive to choices about the variance. We make two choices that lead to a conservative (i.e., higher) estimate of variance. First, we use a variance of 20.3 percent, which is based on data from 1926 through 1999. In recent 8 Their analysis is based on OCACT's intermediate assumptions as presented in the 1998 Trustees Report. 9 If we accept the market valuation of risk, the value of the trade-off would be exactly zero, since the cost of the increased risk from holding equities is exactly equal to the expected increase in returns. (Otherwise, the government would not be able to trade bonds for equities to begin with.) 10 We assume this real return is net of any costs for administering the equity investments; Diamond (2000) notes that estimates of administrative costs for direct trust fund investment have been as low as 0.5 basis points.
decades, the variance has declined. For example, for 1956 through 1999, the variance was 16.4 percent. Our second choice is related to our assumption that the expected return will be lower than the historical average. Theoretically, investors should accept a lower expected return only if they also face lower risk. However, we still use the historical variance, so our projections of uncertainty may be biased upward. This paper necessarily focuses on a single aspect of the debate over investment of Social Security funds. While the trade-off between increased expected returns and increased risk is a central issue in evaluating the effect of investing the trust funds in equities, it is still only one of many considerations.
11 Three major issues that we do not address are:
1) Incidence of Benefit and Risk. We analyze changes in investment policy, but assume current law in all other respects. The incidence of the benefits and risks from equity investment is entirely dependent on how other aspects of the system could be changed. Under a policy that increased payroll taxes to keep the system solvent, the risks of low equity returns would fall on workers; under a policy that cut benefits, the risks would fall on beneficiaries; and under a policy of general fund transfers, the risks would fall on some combination of taxpayers and beneficiaries of other government programs.
2) Effects on Other Government Finances, Investment Returns, and the Macroeconomy. To purchase equities, the government would have to issue more bonds (or redeem fewer, if it was running sufficiently large unified surpluses). From a macroeconomic perspective, government investment in equities would simply be a debt-for-equity swap, with no direct effect on national saving or investment. There would be indirect effects, but they are likely to be small. 12 For example, if the government traded debt for equities, the private sector's portfolio would have to change as well. Private investors might rebalance their taxable and nontaxable holdings, likely causing some change in taxable capital income and thus government revenues. 13 We do not consider any changes to private holdings or general fund tax revenue. We assume historical market returns would continue to explain future market returns, despite the entry of a large buyer, the federal government, into the market.
3) Political Economy. From a political perspective, government control of private assets could lead to increased government control of private industry.
14 We assume only that any social investing decisions that the government does make will not cause the equity returns earned on trust fund investments to deviate from our assumed market average return. Of course, there is political risk even without equity investment, since Social Security law will certainty change repeatedly over the next 75 years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we present a brief explanation of LTAM and how it models uncertainty. LTAM's stochastic results for the system under current law are presented in the fourth sec-11 For a brief non-technical discussion of the main issues surrounding equity investment of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, see Zeldes (1995) . 12 For a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of Social Security and a discussion of indirect macroeconomic effects of equity investment, see Abel (2000) . 13 In addition, low market returns tend to depress general tax revenues and increase required outlays. Therefore, the additional risk from equity investments would likely be correlated with risk already faced by the government. 14 For a discussion of the issues surrounding social investing concerns related to private investment of the Social Security Trust Fund, see Angelis (1998). tion. These results are then compared to a system with 100 percent equity investment and an analysis of the MaintainBenefits investment proposal. We also present some sensitivity analysis about equity returns assumptions and stochastic modeling methods. The final section concludes.
LONG-TERM ACTUARIAL MODEL (LTAM)
LTAM projects Social Security finances over a 75-year horizon and analyzes the sensitivity of these projections to demographic, economic, and behavioral assumptions, and to changes in Social Security tax and benefit rules. 15 The first version of LTAM, completed in late 2000, is designed to generally mimic the Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary's (OCACT) methodology. It allows key parameters to be varied in order to answer questions about how changes in the economic, demographic, and policy assumptions underlying the model affect the system's forecasted surpluses and shortfalls. Because the program is unified and runs in a single executable FORTRAN file, it can be run quickly, allowing the repeated runs necessary for probabilistic analysis. Thus, LTAM can generate a range of estimates for Social Security finances, rather than just one value.
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LTAM is primarily actuarial, or "cellbased," in structure. Conceptually, for each year of the projection LTAM divides the U.S. population into cells, each of which represents a subgroup of the population defined by age, sex, and marital status. Associated with each cell are statistics such as the number of eligible beneficiaries, the number of disabled, the number of workers, and Social Security taxes paid. Because of the complexity and heterogeneity present in the calculation of OASI and DI benefits, average OASI and DI benefits are calculated using a microsimulation based on a sample from the Continuous Wage History Sample (CWHS) of 14,000 workers who began receiving benefits in 1996. To simulate future retiring cohorts, these work histories are adjusted for historical and projected wage growth and changes in labor force participation. Individual benefits are then calculated, and finally average benefits by age and sex are computed. These average benefits can then be assigned to the corresponding population cells. Cell statistics are aggregated, resulting in annual totals of revenues and expenditures, and further manipulated to produce statistics such as the combined trust fund balance in each year.
The nine major demographic, economic, and behavioral assumptions specified in a LTAM simulation are the same as in the annual Social Security Trustees Report. These are the fertility rate, rate of mortality improvement, number of immigrants, real wage growth, inflation, unemployment rate, interest rate, disability incidence rate, and disability termination rate. Demographic assumptions about birth rates, immigration, and life expectancy influence the absolute and relative size of different population groups, thereby affecting both revenues and expenditures. Economic assumptions influence wages and labor force numbers, and hence payroll tax revenues collected and the size of benefits promised. Behavioral responses such as the disability incidence rate, or take-up rate, can also influence both sides of the balance sheet. In addition to these nine variable assumptions, the model allows for changes to policy parameters. Program rules, such as the normal retirement age and the maximum taxable income, are combined with the demographic, economic, and behavioral assumptions to determine revenues and outlays.
One key economic assumption for this paper is that of the interest rate, or real rate of return, earned on investments attributed to the trust funds and its effect on combined trust fund balances. Combined trust fund balances are computed with a simple accounting identity: Payroll taxes are computed using an assumed income distribution, and revenues from taxation of benefits are a fixed percentage of benefits paid. Average benefits do vary by beneficiary type, and by age and sex within the larger beneficiary categories. Other expenses include administrative costs. The interest earned on the trust fund balances is computed by multiplying the assumed real interest rate times the combined balances. Under current-law scenarios, negative balances are treated symmetrically; the system is assumed to be in debt, and interest costs increase this debt. In scenarios where a portion of the combined trust fund is invested in equities, the model assumes that the portfolio is rebalanced each year, so that the total effective return is the average of the government bond interest rate and the equity return, weighted by the portion in each type of investment. Any shift to equities is phased in linearly over a 15-year period. This assumption is more realistic than an immediate policy change and is consistent with a policy proposed by members of the 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security.
If the trust funds are exhausted, the system's borrowing cost is based solely on the interest rate. This results in an asymmetric system, and means that the upside risk will be greater than the downside risk. However, the alternative would be to require the government to sell equities short once the trust funds are exhausted, which we find implausible.
INTRODUCING UNCERTAINTY INTO LTAM
As noted in the introduction, even under current investment practices the Social Security system is not riskless. Uncertainty exists in the future demographic and economic changes that could significantly alter long-term Social Security finances. For example, if mortality improvements increase dramatically due to the discovery of a cure for cancer, the increased longevity of beneficiaries would greatly raise the system's future costs. Because many of the inputs into a model of Social Security finances are uncertain, LTAM was programmed with the ability to explicitly model that uncertainty.
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Developing estimates of uncertainty about system finances begins with developing estimates of uncertainty about the inputs, which are in turn based on historical data. Specifically, we apply standard time-series analysis methods to the historical data to estimate the probability distributions for annual realizations of fertility, mortality improvements, immigration, unemployment, inflation, the real interest rate, real wage growth, disability incidence, and disability termination.
Most of the inputs are modeled according to the Box-Jenkins technique, but three economic variables-unemployment, the real interest rate, and the inflation rate-are modeled according to a VAR(2). The Box-Jenkins technique is a three step process: (1) Perform DickeyFuller tests to determine whether the series is stationary, and if necessary transform the series to obtain a stationary series; (2) Use partial autocorrelation and autocorrelation functions to identify an ARMA or ARIMA model that is parsimonious yet adequately mimics the behavior of the historical series, and estimate the selected model; (3) Generate a set of residuals and test whether they resemble white noise. If not, return to the previous step.
For each of the inputs, we assume that the mean value is equal to the OCACT intermediate input assumptions specified in the 2000 Trustees Report or the equity mean return discussed above, and we model the deviations from those mean values based on historical variation. The estimation procedure yields the following results (refer to the appendix for more details on the various equation specifications).
Fertility is projected in terms of the annual total fertility rate. 18 As Lee (1993) remarked, it is necessary to make some adjustments to the projection of annual total fertility rate series since an unconstrained projection can produce negative fertility rates or extremely large values that are either impossible or unrealistic. Using his method as a guide, annual total fertility rates are limited to a range between zero and four using a logistic transformation. 19 There is some disagreement about whether the fertility rate should be projected as a stationary or a nonstationary series. If a series is nonstationary, then, in essence, it contains two sources of uncertainty-one determined by annual random shocks of the series and another determined by cumulative and permanent persistence of all previous annual random shocks. Thus modeling fertility as a nonstationary process implies that all current decisions of fertility are affected by all previous annual shocks to the annual level. Ignoring the nonstationarity within a series equates to assigning more certainty to the series in future years than may be warranted. It could also be argued that fertility has undergone a number of regime changes that have been caused by large fluctuations in the nation's economic performance and the advancement of birth control technology, and as a result-provided there will be no future regime changes-it may be the case that the fertility series should be limited to the post baby bust period. 20 As a result we are left with a number of conflicting opinions about differencing the fertility series to correct for the nonstationarity. It is our opinion that using the variation over the entire historical series will be sufficient in projecting the variation of a nonstationary series that is bounded between its most plausible values. In this paper, we use an ARMA(4,1) model for annual fertility levels (which assumes stationarity) estimated over the period 1917 to 1997. 21 Annual mortality improvements (changes in the central death rate) are modeled for 42 age and sex groups according to an AR(1) model. All of the series are stationary. For each year of the projection, annual random shocks for each of the age-sex groups are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with a variance covariance matrix estimated from the 18 The annual fertility rate in year t is equal to the sum of annual age-specific fertility rates in year t. 19 The transformed fertility rate is equal to log[(annual total fertility rate)/(4-annual total fertility rate)]. 20 Even when the series is limited to the post baby bust period it still fails to be a stationary series, which means that the series is determined by its random trend regardless of the time period that is selected. 21 See CBO (forthcoming) for results when fertility is modeled as nonstationary using an ARIMA(3,1,0).
Differencing the fertility series has only a slight effect upon the 75-year summary measures of the trust funds, but creates much greater uncertainty by year 2075. Therefore, the choice of ignoring the nonstationarity does not greatly affect the overall results of the projection, just the values in the distant future.
residuals of the 42 age-sex group equations.
As noted above, unemployment (measured as a log-odds ratio), the real interest rate on the Social Security specialissue five-year bonds, and inflation (measured as changes in the CPI-W) are modeled using a VAR(2) specification in order to account for the co-movements of the three series. The growth in real wages is found to be block exogenous from the other three economic assumptions and therefore is adequately modeled as a separate AR(1) process.
Annual legal immigration, the annual disability incidence rate, and the annual disability termination rate are strongly affected by current law, so modeling each of the series requires an assumption about future changes to the law. Each of the series is nonstationary, but it is plausible that historical law changes are the underlying cause of the nonstationarity. As a result, each of the series is modeled as a stationary process under the assumption that current law will not change. Immigration is modeled as an ARMA(4,1), while disability incidence and disability termination are modeled as AR(1) models.
Equity returns have no significant time series patterns. The annual total real return to large company stocks, as indexed in the S&P 500 and taken from Ibbotson Associates (2000), is simply modeled as white noise about an expected equity return. Recall that we assume a real expected annual equity return of 6 percent, a 3 percent equity premium above the expected government bond return of 3 percent. We also test the sensitivity of our results to an assumption of a 7 percent mean equity return and to modeling the equity return deviations using a bootstrap method. Table 1 presents some summary statistics covering the stochastically modeled inputs for the current law baseline and the equity investment alternatives. Means are the average value for the 225,000 realizations of each of the inputs across the 3,000 75-year simulations. The table shows two different measures of variation, the annual variation and the 75-year variation. Annual variation is based on the distribution of the realizations across the 3,000 observations in each of the 75 years. The 75-year variation is based on the distribution of the realizations across 3,000 75-year averages. For every assumption, the annual variation is, as expected, larger than the variation in the 75-year average.
The distinction between the annual and 75-year variation shows up most clearly in the equity return rate. In any given year, the standard deviation on the equity return is over 20 percentage points; however, across the 3,000 75-year averages of equity returns, the standard deviation is significantly lower, at 2.3 percentage points.
The success of any investment strategy depends critically upon the ability to be consistent over long periods of time, even in the face of low returns. One could construct a political economy model in which low returns in early years would induce a withdrawal from the market. This would create a selection bias in which scenarios with large losses in early years but longterm returns approximately equal to the expected equity return would be replaced with scenarios with the same losses in early years but long-term returns approximately equal to the expected risk-free return. Such a model would result in lower longterm expected returns.
Each of the four analyses presented below is based on the same 3,000 input draws. For the analysis of a 7 percent expected return, the equity return was increased by exactly 1 percentage point in each draw.
RESULTS

Baseline Stochastic Results
For the baseline results, LTAM was solved stochastically 3,000 times allowing the demographic, economic, and behav- The text discusses the disability termination rate as the input of interest; LTAM actually models the disability retention rate which by construction is simply 100 percent minus the disability termination rate.
ioral input assumptions to vary, but assuming current trust fund investment practices. The first column of Table 2 and the solid lines in Figure 1 present the distribution of the annual combined OASI and DI Trust Fund ratios (the combined trust fund balance in any given year divided by the combined annual expenditures in that year) and the expected exhaustion date (the year in which the trust funds balance turns negative). 22 In ten years, the system will quite certainly be solvent, but there is a 5 percent chance that by 2027 the trust funds will be exhausted. There is also a 5 percent chance that the system will remain solvent until 2073. Note that the 50 th percentile line does not represent the actual median predicted path for the future of trust fund balances; rather, it represents the median outcome in each year over the 75-year period. A graph of any one of the 3,000 predicted paths is much bumpier, particularly under scenarios, discussed below, when the trust funds are invested in equities.
Investing 100 Percent of the Trust Funds in Equities
We first test an extreme change in investment policy: Investing all positive balances in the trust funds in the stock market. The results are presented in the second column of Table 2 and the dotted lines in Figure 1 . Recall that the investment shift from government bonds to private equities is phased-in over 15 years, so there is a smooth divergence away from the current law paths over that time period. The median prediction under full A more realistic result is the 5 th percentile. Over the short-term, the downside of this policy is below that of the baseline, where the trust funds could be exhausted two years earlier due to the risky investments in private equities. However, over the long-term, the relative risk falls, and, in fact, the 5 th percentile values are quite similar with and without equity investment. Here, the data clearly reveals the relationship between higher expected returns and increased risks, and length of time in a risky investment.
The asymmetry of the equity investment distribution is due to two factors: compounding, which is a general characteristic of any investment, and the fact that the trust funds do not sell short, which is an assumption of the model. First, experiencing several years of high returns results in higher balances, which then results in higher future volatility in dollar terms (though not in percentage terms). Second, because we assume that the government borrows at the risk-free rate, in cases where the investments turn out badly and the trust funds turn negative earlier than expected, the government also shifts to riskless assets earlier than expected. Table 3 emphasizes the importance of presenting both means and variances of system outcomes and recognizing that equity investments are not being introduced into a riskless system. The first two columns compare trust fund ratios out 30 and 75 years for a deterministic solution to LTAM under current law and under uncertain equity returns. Were one to focus only on the medians, investing 100 percent of the trust funds in equities appears to be a great deal, raising the trust fund ratio in 2030 from 1.76 to 2.89 and in 2075 from -14.79 to -12.72. However, including outcome variances suggests equities are adding a huge amount of risk, where there is a 5 percent chance in 2030 the trust fund ratio will fall to -0.85. But, as we note from the outset, this is not the right comparison. Instead, one should focus on the final two columns (data seen previously in Table 2 ) where additional input assumptions are modeled stochastically under current investment practices and equity investments. The range of predicted values is wider in column 4 of Table  3 than in column 2, reflecting the existing uncertainty in the system. Note that under current law, there is also a chance of negative balances in 2030, although equities still make the down-side worse. Comparing column 4 to column 3 gives the true increase in uncertainty from introducing equity investments. Figure 2 presents the annual and conditional probabilities that the trust fund balance would be greater under a 100 percent equity investment policy relative to current investment practices. (These probabilities are derived by comparing 3,000 pairs of scenarios. Each pair draws identical inputs, but one is run under current law and the other with the policy of complete equity investment.) The top solid line shows the percent of the 3,000 simulations within each year where the trust fund balance is equal or greater under complete equity investment. The bottom solid line shows the probability that the trust fund balance under complete equity investment would be greater than the trust fund balance under current investment practices given that all previous years have also had higher balances-that is, the share of simulations where the outcome has always been better.
The annual probabilities rise over time for the first 25 years, reflecting the lower risk of longer holding periods. (The slight decrease in later years is an artifact of the asymmetric investment strategy: Investments may have a particularly bad year and fall substantially, but once the trust funds are exhausted there is no chance to make up the losses in a later bull market.) However, the conditional probabilities fall over time. There is an 80 percent chance that within the first five years, there will be at least one year in which the trust fund balances are lower than they would be under current investment policy. A lower value in just one year of a multi-year series is not particularly important compared to the overall trend, but it could have important political implications. Bad outcomes in early years could turn public opinion against a strategy of equity investment, resulting in a tendency to withdraw from the market immediately following downturns.
The first two figures present quite differing perspectives on equity investments. Figure 1 shows how beneficial equity investment could be, while Figure 2 emphasizes the large probability that things could be worse. Figure 3 links these two perspectives. The top line shows the mean increase in the trust fund ratio in each year due to equity investment, but only for those cases in which equity investment resulted in higher balances. Analogously, the bottom line shows the mean decrease in the trust fund ratio in each year due to equity investment, but only for those cases in which equity investment resulted in lower balances. In other words, while Figure 2 shows the probability of a gain or loss to the trust funds due to equity investment, Figure 3 shows the mean magnitudes of those gains and losses. The graph shows clearly that the mean gain in trust fund balances is much greater than the mean loss.
Figures 2 and 3 also both reflect the asymmetry that comes from assuming that the trust funds will borrow at the risk-free rate after exhaustion. If equities perform badly, the trust funds will become exhausted earlier than under current law. Once the trust funds are exhausted, both the scenarios with and without equity investment face the same interest rates (as well as the same values for all other inputs), so the difference in trust fund values remains essentially constant. There is no way for the equity investment scenario to catch up, which explains why the top line in Figure 2 remains flat in later years. On the other hand, the equity investment scenario cannot fall further behind, which is why the magnitude of the bottom line in Figure 3 is small.
One additional way to measure the effects of equity investment on the trust funds is presented in Figure 4 , the cumulative probability that the balance will go negative over time relative to current investment practices. Under current law, the probability that the trust fund is exhausted rises from 20 percent in 2030 to over 75 percent in 2044. Clearly, equity investments add risk to the system, spreading out the likely exhaustion dates. From 2017 to 2031, the probability of going broke is higher with equity investment, but over time, if the system has been doing well in previous years, the probability is lower.
Investing 40 Percent of the Trust Funds in Equities
We recognize that it is unlikely that policy makers would go so far as to invest the entire balance of the OASI and DI Trust Funds in equities. Actual proposals have focused on investing surpluses above a certain liquidity threshold (Aaron and Reischauer's proposal to invest surpluses above 150 percent of annual outlays) or on shares much smaller than 100 percent (former President Clinton's 14.6 percent investment proposal or the 1994-96 Advisory Board's 40 percent MaintainBenefits investment proposal). Therefore, the second equity investment policy tested is an equity investment of 40 percent of trust fund balances, also with a 15-year phase-in. See column 3 in Table 2 and the solid lines in Figure 5 for LTAM's results under this policy assumption. Again, in 2010 Again, in , 2030 Again, in , and 2075 , the median outcome with a 40 percent equity investment is higher than under current law. However, the 5 th percentile in the short run is still lower.
In general, outcomes of a moderate investment policy are as expected: measures of both risk and return fall between values that would be realized under current law and those that would be realized under a policy of full equity investment. Compared to current law, there is still always a significant probability of lower trust fund balances: 35 percent in 2010, 30 percent in 2025, and 27 percent in 2040 and later (see the dotted lines in Figure 2 ). However, due to the increase in expected returns and the low exposure to risk in the phase-in years, the cumulative probability of trust fund exhaustion is always equal to or lower than the probability under current law (see Figure 4) .
Sensitivity Test of the Assumed Real Expected Returns to Equity
Our assumption about the real expected equity returns in the previous two alternatives was 6 percent. SSA/OCACT assumed a 7 percent real average equity return in their past analysis of trust fund equity investment proposals. 24 The dotted lines in Figure 5 show the expected difference in outcomes assuming a 7 percent real average return relative to 6 percent. As expected, the higher expected return shifts the distribution up in all years, but does little to decrease the range since there is no less variation about equity returns. The median expected exhaustion date is improved from 2040 to 2042.
Sensitivity to Modeling Equity Deviations using Bootstrap Methods
Using bootstrap methods, we also tested the sensitivity of our results to two assumptions: 1) the distribution of equity returns is normal, and 2) there is no correlation between equity returns and the other economic input variables.
First, if the distribution of equity returns is not normal-for example, if it has thicker tails than a normal distributionthen the distribution of our results would be biased. We compared our results from the original scenario to results from an alternative scenario in which the equity return deviations are drawn from the actual deviations from 1926 to 1999. The results were essentially unchanged from the Monte Carlo results, with trust-fund ratios generally varying by only about 2 percent for any given year and percentile.
Second, while there are no correlations between equity returns and real wage growth or government bond interest rates in the annual data, there may be some correlation over the long term. We attempted to capture any possible historical correlation by using bootstrapped deviations for equities and the four economic variables. 25 The bootstrap results are only marginally different from the Monte Carlo results, with slightly lower 5 th percentiles after 2020 (again, trust-fund ratios generally varied by only a few percent). Given these tests, we are comfortable that our primary results, which rely on the Monte Carlo modeling method, are robust.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the effects of investing a portion of the OASI and DI Trust Funds in equities on future trust fund ratios, emphasizing both means and variances. As expected, equity investments would improve the system's expected long-term finances at the median and especially-at least under our assumptions of exogenous interest rates and equity premiums-at the top of the distribution. However, at the bottom of the distribution, weaker results reflect the higher risk of equities, particularly in the short-term. After ten years, trust fund balances at the 25 percentile level would still be worse under 100 percent equity investment than they would under current law. This risk is reduced over time, so that in 75 years, only at the 1 percentile level would the system be worse off-assuming a steady investment strategy. From a scenario-byscenario perspective, however, equity investment would result in lower balances nearly 40 percent of the time. Under a more realistic policy proposal, investing only 40 percent of the trust funds in equities, the median expected date for exhaustion of the combined trust funds is increased by four years from the baseline, but the downside risk remains.
These results show that shifting trust fund balances into equities without either reducing benefits or increasing taxes can be expected to help, but not save, the system. If society places a large value on not harming Social Security finances, then the additional risk created by equity investments-the chance that equities could lose value and thus result in lower trust fund balances-may not be worth the expected benefits.
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Appendix: Estimates of Time-Series Equations for Input Assumptions and Equity Returns
Equations for each of the inputs were estimated according to basic time-series econometric techniques. For each of the series the goal is to find an equation that sufficiently captures the properties of the historical time series and employs an economical number of variables to yield a plausible fit of the model. Two sets of tests are performed to guarantee that the historical time series is stationary and that the residuals of the fitted model are white noise. The only inputs that fail to pass tests of stationarity are fertility and the policy-dominated inputs disability incidence, disability retention, and immigration. For a few age groups the residuals of the mortality reduction time series equations failed to pass the test for white noise.
Each of the variables have been estimated by either an AR(1) process, a VAR model, or an ARMA model involving 3 or 4 autoregressive variables along with a moving average representation of the annual fluctuations.
26 For a summary of the estimations see Tables A.1 through A.4.
• Fertility: Historical fertility data are available for the period 1917 through 1997. termination that is equivalent to one minus disability retention modeled here.
• Equity returns: Historical total real equity returns data is available for the period 1926 through 1999. Total returns to large company stocks are modeled as a white noise process, i.e., AR(0), x t = 0.100 +ε t .
• Mortality Improvements: Historical data on mortality improvements are available for the period 1900 through 1995. An AR (1) process is used to model annual improvements in the central death rates for 42 separate age and sex groups. Tables A.2 and A.3 list the coefficients, standard errors, and the p-values for the test of white noise of the residuals. The p-values for the Dickey-Fuller test are equal to zero, so they are not included. The covariance of the annual random shocks is also calculated and used during the simulation phase. For instance, the correlation between male age 10-14 and male age 15-19 mortality reductions is 0.93. Since the deterministic model does not include this estimated co-variation, the variation of the mortality across the high and low scenarios is far greater than the stochastic model. To simulate the annual random shocks and the covariance between them, a random vector of 21 normal random errors are generated for each sex from a random number generator. These 21 normal random errors are then transformed according to the variance covariance structure of the errors by multiplying the vector of errors with the Cholesky vector, which is the triangular decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the random shocks.
• Economic Variables: Historical data on unemployment, inflation, and real interest rates are available for the period 1954 through 1999. The economic variables of unemployment, 27 inflation, and real interest are estimated together in a vector autoregressive model, such that each variable is a function of its own previous values as well as the previous values of the other two variables (see Table A .4 for the coefficients). In each of the series the residuals appear to be white noise and the series is stationary. It should be noted that the p-values for the Dickey-Fuller tests are only less than 0.1 for unemployment and real interest rates, thus indicating that these series weakly reject the unit root null hypothesis. Following the recommendation of Enders (1995) , the variables are not differenced.
As similarly employed in the mortality projection, the variance and covariance of the random shocks of the three variables are estimated in order to have plausible co-movements between the economic variables.
